The theoretical foundations of data hiding have been revealed by formulating the problem as message communication over a noisy channel. We revisit the problem in light of a more general characterization of the watermark channel and of weighted distortion measures. Considering spread spectrum based information hiding, we release the usual assumption of an i.i.d. cover signal. The game-theoretic resolution of the problem reveals a generalized characterization of optimum attacks. The paper then derives closed-form expressions for the different parameters exhibiting a practical embedding and extraction technique.
INTRODUCTION
Information hiding refers to nearly invisible embedding of a message within a host signal. This paper focuses on the data hiding problem, assuming a blind and symmetric system. In the spirit of a communication problem one seeks the maximum rate of reliable transmission over any hiding and attack strategies. This rate is called the hiding capacity and depends on admissible distortion levels and on the watermark channel characterization.
Watermarking is often regarded as a form of spread spectrum communication with various forms of channel characterizations. The perceptual sensitivity of the host signal is often taken into account for choosing embedding sites and strength [1, 7] . The attacks are often modelled as the addition of White Gaussian noise (AWGN) [8, 4] , or as linear filtering plus additive noise [9, 3] . The authors in [10] show that the optimum attack is obtained by Wiener filtering and that to be maximally robust, the watermark should have a power spectrum matching the one of the original signal.
The problem of robust embedding and extraction based on spread spectrum is revisited here in light of a more general model of the cover signal and of the watermark channel. Most of the approaches introduced so far consider that the cover signal can be modelled as an ergodic wide sense stationary Gaussian random process. This assumption is rarely satisfied for real signals. We assume instead that it can be modelled as the realization of a set of independent non identically distributed Gaussian random variables (referred to as non i.i.d. signals). The attack channel is considered to be of the type amplitude scaling and additive white Gaussian noise (SAWGN) [2] . The game-theoretic resolution of the problem with weighted distortion measures leads to a characterization of optimum attack domains. By maximizing the watermarking channel signal to noise ratio, we then derive a closed-form expression of the watermark spectral density corresponding to the best defense. The performance limits of the approach in terms of hiding capacity are then analyzed. The approach can be seen as a generalization of previous work to the case of non i.i.d. Gaussian sources, considering weighted distortion measures and a more general SAWGN attack channel, with the exhibition of closed-form expressions for a practical embedding and extraction scheme.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Let b = {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n } with b i ∈ {−1, +1} ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} be the message to be embedded in a host signal x. Many approaches introduced so far assume that the signal x can be modelled as an ergodic zero-mean wide sense stationary Gaussian random process [4, 9] . This assumption is rarely satisfied for real signals or for content adaptive watermarks. We assume instead that the host signal x can be modelled as the realization of a set of non stationary Gaussian random variables X = {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X m } where
The information is then used as a key for indexing pseudo-random noise sequences which are additively combined with the signal. Let G be a n × m matrix composed of n pseudo-random generated vectors G j ∈ {−1, +1} m . The watermarked signal is obtained by
where x i represents the i th site of the host signal and y i the corresponding watermarked site. In order to extract each embedded bit b i , a correlation product between the vector G j and y is computed. The term α i is a weighting factor allowing to adjust the amplitude (or energy) of the mark. In the following we derive a closed-form expression of this parameter in the case of SAWGN attacks, with weighted distortion measures and non i.i.d Gaussian cover signals. The attack channel is often assumed to be AWGN [6] . This model assumes that the distortion induced by the attack is independent of the watermarked signal, hence can hardly apply to attacks such as filtering and compression. More accurate models assuming that the distortion depends on the watermarked signal and based on linear filtering plus additive noise have been considered in [9, 3] . Here, we consider that the attacked signal y ′ can be expressed as
where γ i is an attenuation factor on each watermarked site. This amounts to consider the attack channel as a SAWGN channel (amplitude scaling by the factor γ i , and additive white Gaussian noise of δ i ∼ N (0, σ 2 δi )). The distortion measure is defined as a weighted sum of the MSE on each sample of the host signal, in order to reflect the perceptual quality. The embedding distortion is therefore given by
where ϕ i is a perceptual factor. Similarly, the expected attack distortion is given by
MAP WATERMARK ESTIMATION
The maximun a posteriori (MAP) estimation of the bit b j is defined as
The a posteriori probability P = P (B j = b j | Y ′ m = y ′ ) can be rewritten (using Bayes law) as
Since the received vector y ′ is fixed, and that no a priori knowledge on the message b is assumed, we have the a posteriori probability
, where ∝ denotes an obvious renormalization. Assuming that the watermarked sites are independent, it can be shown [5] that the quantity can be expressed as a product of Gaussian distributions of the form
where C is a constant and
with
. (11) The term b j represents the optimal estimator. From Eqn. (8) and (9), watermarking channel can be seen as a gaussian channel. Estimator's performance can be measured in terms of the signal to noise ratio E b /N 0 of the watermarking channel. This quantity is defined as the ratio between the energy of the embedded bit and the overall noise introduced by the cover signal (σ 2
where
4 GAME-THEORETIC RESOLUTION
The optimization of the embedding and attack parameters can be formulated as a game between an attacker and a hider. The attack searches the two vectors γ and σ δ minimizing the extractor performance (i.e. E b /N 0 ) while maintaining the distortion below an acceptable level (D xy ′ < D max xy ′ ). This problem can be solved by a Lagrangian optimization:
where λ > 0 is a Lagrangian multiplier. From Eqn. (4) and (12) it appears that J λ is an additive functional. The optimization can then be made separately on each J λ,i given by
by setting its derivatives with respect to the attack parameters γ i and σ δi
and
to zero on the validity domain. The resolution of the resulting set of equations leads to the following two expressions for σ 2 δi :
Equating Eqn.(16) and (17) leads to the optimum values
and σ
where γ w i = Table 1 gives the corresponding expressions of the cost function J λ,i (γ i , σ δi ) denoted J E , J W and J I for respectively the erase, Wiener and intermediate attacks. To find the optimum attack, one has to find on each domain (defined in terms of α i and σ Xi ), the attack that will minimize J λ,i (γ i , σ δi ). From table 1 and constraints (20)- (21) the minimum values of J λ,i (γ i , σ δi ), in the domains of validity of γ i and σ δi , are given by J E and J W on D 1 and D 3 respectively (see [5] for details). Similarly, on D 2 , J I ≤ J E and J I ≤ J W . Thus, if the validity constraint γ ⋆ i ≥ 0 of the Intermediate attack domain is satisfied, the optimum attack is given by the Intermediate attack (with parameters given by Eqn. (18) and (19) ). Otherwise, the attacker should use instead the Erase or the Wiener solution. Given the optimum attack, we then search the parameters α i (strength of the watermark) that maximize E b /N 0 , under constraints of a maximum watermarked signal distortion (D max xy ). This leads to a Lagrangian approach:
where χ > 0 is a Lagrangian multiplier. The cost function J χ being the additive functional
, the optimization can be carried out separately on each
. Let us consider the three attack strategies. In the case of the Erase attack, i.e.
is a decreasing function and the minimum valid value of α i is given by α
Xi . In D 2 , setting the derivative
to zero leads to µ 2 − µα i − χnϕ 
Setting the derivative of J χ,i (σ 
to zero, given that σ
This provides a closed-form of the optimum embedding parameter α i in terms of the host signal power spectrum (σ 2 Xi ) and for an SAWGN attack. The Wiener filtering can restore the signal, hence may lead to D xy ′ < D xy . This can be avoided by filtering the watermarked signal (after embedding). The distortion measure is then 
The resolution of the problem leads to new parameters (see [5] for details):
Xi . Fig. 2 illustrates the variations of the parameter α i in terms of σ 2 Xi for both approaches i.e., without (bold curve) and with a Wiener post-filtering (light curve) of the watermarked signal (with ϕ i = (1 + σ Xi ) −1/2 ). Unlike [1] , it can be observed that for high values of σ 2 Xi , no watermark can be robustly embedded on the corresponding sites.
RESULTS
The approach has been tested on images against techniques using α i = constant, and α i = c|x i | [6] , considering embedding in the wavelet transform domain. −1/2 ) with the different techniques. The watermarked image has been attacked with a lossy compression JPEG, from 95% to 5% quality. The tests, using the Stirmark benchmark have shown that the technique is robust to all the non-geometric attacks.
CONCLUSION
This paper provides an information-theoretic analysis of information hiding in non i.i.d signals with perceptual distortion metrics. Note that previous work, when considering perceptual watermaking was often led by intuition. Here we have derived closed-form expressions of the different extraction and embedding parameters, revealing an efficient and practical information hiding system.
